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The paper studies the relationship between teenagers’ first labour market 
experience and subsequent labour market performance using data on all 
Swedish youths graduating from vocational high school programmes in 1991–
94. Sibling fixed-effects combined with detailed data on high school pro-
grammes, grades and work experience during high school are used in order to 
identify the causal long-run effects of experiencing unemployment subsequent 
to graduation. The results show a 3 percentage-points increase in the unem-
ployment probability and a 17 % reduction in annual earnings after 5 years due 
to post-graduation unemployment. The results thus show that teenage labour 




Keywords: Youth unemployment, Scarring, State dependence, Siblings 
                                                      
♣I thank Olof Åslund, Erika Ekström, Peter Fredriksson, Alan Krueger, Rafael Lalive, Eva Mörk 
and seminar participants at IFAU, SOFI, The Economic Council of Sweden and the 2004 EEA 
conference for helpful comments and suggestions.  
*Institute for labour market policy evaluation (IFAU), Email: oskar.nordstrom_skans@ifau.uu.se. 
Phone +46 18 471 70 79. IFAU – Scarring effects of the first labour market experience  2 
Table of contents 
1 Introduction  ...............................................................................................  3 
2 Background................................................................................................  4 
2.1 Previous literature......................................................................................  4 
2.2 The economic environment and institutions..............................................  7 
3 The empirical framework  ........................................................................  10 
4 Data and descriptive statistics..................................................................  13 
4.1 Data..........................................................................................................  13 
4.1.1 Education and work experience...............................................................  13 
4.1.2 Demographic variables............................................................................  14 
4.1.3 Unemployment and employment.............................................................  15 
4.1.4 Aggregate covariates  ...............................................................................  16 
4.2 Descriptive statistics................................................................................  18 
5 Sibling fixed effects estimates.................................................................  21 
5.1 Different forms of duration dependence..................................................  26 
6 Sub-sample OLS estimates......................................................................  27 
7 Concluding remarks.................................................................................  32 
References..........................................................................................................  33 
Appendix A: Covariates.....................................................................................  37 
Appendix B: Further OLS-estimates  .................................................................  41 
 IFAU – Scarring effects of the first labour market experience  3 
1 Introduction 
Young workers have higher entry rates into unemployment and  higher exit 
rates out-of unemployment than older workers. As a result, young worker have 
relatively short unemployment spells which may suggest that youth unem-
ployment is a harmless state requiring little attention from the policymakers. 
Nevertheless, most countries provide specific active labour market programs 
targeted at young workers. One possible rationale for policymakers’ focus on 
youth unemployment is that some young workers may experience very long-
term negative effects even from short unemployment spells, a phenomenon 
usually referred to as “state dependence” or “scarring”. 
There is a vast previous literature on the long-term consequences of 
unemployment. However, identifying causal effects of past unemployment is a 
difficult task due to problems with unobserved heterogeneity: the estimated 
effects will be larger than the true effects if workers differ in their underlying 
probability of being unemployed for reasons that we are unable to control for. 
Thus, separating the effects of unobserved heterogeneity from the causal 
effects of previous unemployment (i e the true scarring effect) is a fundamental 
problem in this literature. Most previous studies have relied on distributional 
assumptions regarding the unobservable component in order to solve this 
problem. The results in these studies suggest that unemployment do indeed 
have persistent negative effects, at least for prime aged workers. However, the 
estimates are likely to be biased towards this finding unless the distributional 
assumptions are fulfilled.  
This paper explores a uniquely rich data set containing family identifiers 
facilitating the use of within-family comparisons as a tool to separate causal 
effects from unobserved heterogeneity. The identifying assumption is that 
sibling fixed effects together with individual level covariates capture all 
relevant heterogeneity. We study the early labour market careers of four entire 
cohorts of graduates from Swedish vocational high school programmes and use 
detailed information on grades, field of study and in-school work experience as 
controls for differences between siblings. The detailed individual level 
information have a large impact on the variable of interest in models without 
sibling fixed effects, but only a minor impact once we include sibling fixed 
effects. This suggests that the within-family-comparisons model is indeed a 
powerful tool for removing a potential bias stemming from individual IFAU – Scarring effects of the first labour market experience  4 
heterogeneity. However, it comes at a cost of a substantial reduction in sample 
size and degrees of freedom. 
The results show that unemployment subsequent to graduation gives rise to 
significant “scars” that remain for at least 5 years after the initial unem-
ployment experience. The magnitude is far from negligible: 50 days of unem-
ployment in the year following high school graduation leads to a 3 percentage-
points higher probability to experience a similar period of unemployment (and 
a decrease in total annual earnings of 17 %) 5 years later. 
We also estimate models controlling for observable family background 
instead of using sibling fixed effects. This introduces a bias to the estimates but 
increases the precision which allows us to study the effects in smaller sub-
samples. The results indicate that the long run effects of teenage unemployment 
are similar across various sub-groups defined by gender, ethnicity or business-
cycle at the time of labour market entry which strengthen our belief in the 
results.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives the institutional 
background and Section 3 defines the empirical model. Section 4 describes the 
data and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 5 shows the sibling fixed 





2.1 Previous  literature 
Unemployment may have negative effects on future labour market performance 
for several different reasons: A first explanation has to do with human capital, 
either due to the forgone work experience during the unemployment spell or, 
perhaps more seriously, if people’s skills actually deteriorate during a spell of 
inactivity as suggested by Edin & Gustavsson (2004). It is thus possible that 
(the market value of) skills acquired during high school may depreciate 
relatively fast unless the skills are used.  
Second, if hiring takes place under uncertainty about worker productivity, 
employers may use previous unemployment spells as a screening device in IFAU – Scarring effects of the first labour market experience  5 
their hiring process and thus prefer to hire workers with shorter unemployment 
histories.
1  
Third, institutions such as seniority rules that protect workers with long 
tenure on the expense of short tenured workers will give those receiving jobs 
early an advantage over those receiving their jobs later. This advantage may be 
important whenever a firm is hit by negative a shock, even if the shock arrives 
much later (see e g Eliasson & Storrie, 2004).  
Finally, very young workers’ preferences for work and leisure may be 
influenced by their early experiences. Some support in this direction can be 
found in the literature on social interactions (for example Hedström, Kolm & 
Åberg, 2003, and Stutzer & Lalive, 2003) which argue that the stigma of 
unemployment is affected by the labour market position of the reference group 
and that a smaller stigma may lower the outflow from unemployment. If 
unemployment  per se causes teenagers to spend more time with other 
unemployed people, they may eventually have a reference group with weaker 
labour force attachment. According to the above logic, this could reduce the 
stigma of unemployment and thus also the incentive to work. 
The empirical literature on scarring or “state-dependence” dates back to the 
early 1980s with papers by Ellwood (1982), Corcoran (1982) and Heckman & 
Borjas (1980).  The papers by Ellwood and Heckman & Borjas clearly 
identified the empirical obstacles that must be overcome in order to identify 
causal (or “true”) state dependence. The basic problem is to separate causal 
effects from unobserved heterogeneity since any unobserved characteristics 
that causes a person to be unemployed at one point in time is likely to do so 
also in the future. There are basically three solutions that have been applied in 
the empirical literature: i) rely on observable characteristics ii) use aggregate 
unemployment as an instrumental variable or iii) make distributional assump-
tions regarding the unobserved component.  
Ellwood (1982) studies US data from the NLSY and concludes that the 
effect of early non-employment on future employment probability is small but 
that the effect on wages is large. Corcoran (1982) studies a NLS sample of 
women and reaches similar conclusions regarding wages but also finds 
                                                      
1 In a survey of Swedish firms by Agell & Bennmarker (2002), employers confirm this idea. 
Further support is found in Eriksson and Lagerström (2004) who show that unemployed job 
seekers receive fewer job contacts than employed job seekers even after controlling for all 
information available to the employers using data from a Swedish “applicant data base”. IFAU – Scarring effects of the first labour market experience  6 
evidence of persistent negative employment effects. Heckman & Borjas (1980), 
in their empirical application, find little evidence of true state dependence. The 
most recent study on US data is by Mroz & Savage (2001) that use data from 
the NLSY in a dynamic model with lagged instruments and find significant 
effects four years after an unemployment spell on both annual earnings 
(approximately 1 % from 10 weeks of unemployment) and the unemployment 
probability (4 % from 10 weeks of unemployment). Evidence suggesting that 
unemployment may affect future wages through “implicit contracts” can be 
found in the paper by Beadry & DiNardo (1991) who show that wages are 
affected by the aggregate unemployment rate at the time of hiring. 
For the UK Arulampalam, Booth & Taylor (2000) used data from the 
British Houshold Panel Survey (BHPS) and a random effects specification 
finding evidence of state dependence in unemployment, a result confirmed by 
Arulampalam (2002) using a similar identification strategy. In addition she 
finds that the effects were smaller for workers under 25. Studies on British data 
that rely on observables for identification include Arulampalam (2001) that 
finds a 14 % earnings loss 3 years after an unemployment spell in the BHPS, 
Gregory & Jukes (2001) that uses administrative data and find a short-run 
effect of unemployment incidence and a long run effect of unemployment 
duration and Gregg (2001) using the National Child Development Survey who 
finds evidence of state dependence in unemployment, particularly for men. 
Gregg (2001) also uses aggregate unemployment as an instrument for 
individual unemployment which, surprisingly, generates larger estimates. 
Burgess, Propper, Rees & Shearer (2003) use a different approach and controls 
for aggregate unemployment and find negative effects for the non-skilled of 
entering the labour market in a cohort with high youth unemployment. 
Evidence from other countries are scarce, Hämäläinen (2003) applies a cor-
related random effects model to Finnish data and finds evidence of short-term 
scarring effects, in particular for low-educated workers. Knights, Harris and 
Loundes (2002) use a similar method on Australian data finding evidence of 
scarring effects of unemployment. Muhleisen & Zimmerman (1994) applies a 
random effects probit to German data and find evidence of short run state 
dependence.
  Clark, Gorgellis & Sanfey (1999) also use German data and show 
that unemployment leads to long-lasting disutility effects, at least for men. 
There is also a potentially relevant literature on plant closings. The surveys 
in Kletzer (1998) and Fallick (1996) provide evidence of negative effects from 
plant closings during at least a few years. A recent example on Swedish data is IFAU – Scarring effects of the first labour market experience  7 
Eliasson & Storrie (2004) how show that there are significant negative effects 
of plant closings that can be reinforced when the business cycle turns bad, even 
several years after the initial shutdown. However, it is not evident to which 
extent evidence from plant closings can be generalised to other sources of 
unemployment.  
Little other relevant evidence exists on Swedish data. Exceptions are Åslund 
& Rooth (2003) who find that refugee immigrants that where placed in munic-
ipalities with high unemployment rates performed worse at the labour market 
for a long period of time and Hansen & Lofstrom (2003) who study the 
dynamics of welfare receipt among immigrants and native Swedes. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that scarring is a real phenomenon.
2 On the 
other hand, the results suggest that the effects are smaller for young workers 
and, furthermore, estimates of scarring effects are likely to be upward biased if 
the observed covariates or distributional assumptions fail to appropriately 
control for individual heterogeneity.  
 
2.2  The economic environment and institutions 
The analysis of this paper is based on data on the cohorts graduating from 
Swedish high schools between 1991 and 1994. The cohorts are followed until 
the year 2001. This is the most turbulent period in the Swedish labour market 
since World War II: The unemployment rate which had been below 5 % since 
the 1960s (and was below 2 % in the late 1980s) suddenly increased to 8 % in 
the early 1990s. Explanations for this severe recession are typically based on a 
combination of bad policies and bad luck (see e g Holmlund 2003). The 
unemployment rate remained high until the late 1990s when it started to decline 
and by the year 2002 the unemployment rate had declined to 4 %. The time 
pattern for youth unemployment showed a similar time pattern to the overall 
unemployment rate (see Figure 1). 
 
                                                      
2 The main exceptions are the early papers by Ellwood (1982), for employment, and Heckman & 
Borjas (1980). However it should be noted that these papers, as pointed out in the papers 
themselves, use very small (N = 364 and 122) and non-representative samples, which suggests 





























1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Year
Unemployment rate Unemployment rate, age 16-24
Source: The Swedish Labour Force Surveys (AKU), SCB.
 
Figure 1: Unemployment rates 1986–2002. 
 
The 1990s also saw a rapid expansion of the proportion of the working aged 
population enrolled in some form of education. Part of this expansion was due 
to increased participation in regular education but another reason was active 
policy measures aimed at the unemployed (and to some extent also to the 
employed) such as the “Adult education initiative”. As a result, the employ-
ment to population rates did not recovered as well as the unemployment rates 
after the recession, especially not for younger workers (see Figure 2).  
Our empirical model will account for the varying business cycle environ-
ment through year dummies. Furthermore, in a robustness analysis we will 
estimate separate effects separately for the cohort that graduated in 1991 when 
labour market conditions still were relatively decent in order to see how the 









































1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Year
Employment rate, 16-64 Employment rate, 16-24
Source: The Swedish Labour Force Surveys (AKU), SCB.
 
Figure 2: Employment to population rates 1986-2002. 
 
The Swedish educational system requires that all children start school during 
their 7
th year and attend 9 years of compulsory schooling. After finishing 9
th 
grade (during their 16
th year) most students choose to start high school. As an 
example, 85 % of those born 1973 graduated from high school before the age 
of 20 (see Table 1 below).  
High school students are enrolled in one of several possible “programmes”. 
Admissions to the programmes are based on the compulsory school grade point 
average (GPA) whenever there are more applicants than can be admitted. 
During the period of study (1991−94) the programmes were standardized into 
three main categories: academic 3-year programmes, academic 2-year pro-
grammes and vocational 2-year programmes. 
As is evident from Table 1, most university students came from the 3-year 
programmes while employment at age 20 was much higher amongst the 
graduates from 2-year programmes. On some locations there was also a 
piloting scheme with vocational 3-year programmes.
3 Since the role of these 
                                                      
3 Due to a reform of the vocational programmes in the early 1990s, all Swedish high school 
students graduating after 1994 received a 3 year long education that qualifies for university 
studies. However, this institutional change does not apply to the cohorts included in this study. IFAU – Scarring effects of the first labour market experience  10
programmes mainly was as substitutes for the shorter vocational programmes, 
they will be treated as identical to the shorter programmes in the analysis (see 
Ekström, 2002, for an evaluation of the pilot-programmes). 
 
Table 1: The high school programmes 
Education at age 20  Ni 
Share of total 
(Ni/N) 
Employed 
at age 20 
Tertiary 
education at age 
27 
Less than high school   16,234 0.15  0.33  0.08 
2-year high school   36,898 0.34  0.46  0.15 
3-year high school   46,247 0.43  0.33  0.53 
Tertiary education   9,300 0.09  0.17  1 
All  108,679 1  0.36  0.37 
Note: Groups are defined from completed high school programmes. Sample includes all 
individuals born in 1973 that lived in Sweden in both 1993 and 2000 (excluding 2000 missing 
values). Employment is for November. “Tertiary education” includes graduates of the 4-year 
high school engineering programme. 
 
In theory all students from the academic programmes (but, in general not 
those from vocational programmes) where eligible for university admission. 
However, in practice most university programmes had requirements that ex-
cluded applicants from the 2-year academic programmes. As a consequence, 
the transition rates from the 2-year academic programmes were as low as from 
the vocational programmes. It should be noted, however, that the adult edu-
cation system (Komvux) provided an opportunity to complement the studies for 




3 The  empirical  framework 
Based on Gregg (2001) we may identify three possible reasons for an 
association between teenage unemployment and future labour market per-
formance:  
1.  Individual heterogeneity: some people are more prone to unemploy-
ment due to preferences or innate ability. 
2.  Labour market persistence: a young worker may become 
unemployed due to poor labour market conditions. The individual IFAU – Scarring effects of the first labour market experience  11 
will be more likely to be unemployed in the future as well, if these 
conditions are persistent. 
3.  Scarring: Unemployment in itself may generate unemployment in 
the future either through firm discrimination, human capital depre-
ciation or other mechanisms. 
 
More formally we can assume a two-period data generating model: in 
period 0 the worker enters the labour market and in period t we measure the 
effects of unemployment in period 0. Let  i X  be a vector of observed individual 
specific characteristics, and let  i R  denote an unobserved individual specific 
effect for individual i having the effect νt at time t. Let
j
it A  be the labour market 
conditions faced by the individual at time t at the labour market j. Allowing for 
unemployment scarring in period t we get a model determining the 
unemployment of individual i in period 0 (denoted by  0 i U ) and the labour 
market performance in period t (denoted by  it Y ): 
 
  io i
j
io i io R A X U ε λ β + + + = 0 0  (1) 
 
  it i t io t
j
it t t i it R v U A X Y ε γ λ β + + + + = . (2) 
 
In the empirical applications of this equation t will range from 1 to 10 (at 
most). Our main identifying strategy uses sibling fixed effects (αi
S) to proxy for 







it t t i it u U A X Y + + + + = α γ λ β . (3) 
 
Thus, the identifying assumption behind the sibling fixed effects estimates is 
that all differences between siblings that are correlated with both unem-
                                                      
4 One common method used in order to identify state dependence is to rely on distributional 
assumptions such as correlated random effects models. However, one drawback with this method 
is that the underlying assumptions are difficult to validate. Furthermore, since we specifically 
look at the effect of the initial state we only have one observation per individual in each 
regression, making it impossible to include individual-specific random effects. 
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ployment at time 0 and labour market performance at time t are captured by the 
individual specific variables included in X, i.e. such that  
cov (uit  , Ui0) = 0 for all t.  
We also estimate an “OLS-specification” where we proxy the unobserved 
individual component by observable family characteristics (Zit) instead of the 
sibling fixed effect:  
 
it it t io
j
it t t i it Z U A X Y η φ γ λ β + + + + = . (4) 
 
This model can only be given causal interpretation if it can be argued that all 
differences between individuals that are correlated with both initial unemploy-
ment and subsequent performance are captured either by the observed indi-
vidual specific information (the X-vector) or the observed family background 
variables (the Z-vector) , i.e. such that cov (ηit  , Ui0) = 0 for all t. The main 
reason for estimating the OLS specification is that it greatly increases the 
sample size and thus the precision in the estimates. Since the identifying 
assumptions are stronger in the OLS specification, we will only use it to check 
for differences in estimates between different sub-samples. 
The aim of the applied empirical models is to generate a situation where we 
are comparing two groups that are (conditionally) identical, where one group 
did become unemployed, and the other did not, and compare the subsequent 
outcomes of these two groups. The logic behind the models rest on the standard 
assumption (see e g Pissarides 2000) that matching frictions are important at 
the labour market (see Ridder & van den Berg, 2003, for empirical evidence). 
Matching frictions imply that even identical individuals will end up in different 
states when first entering the labour market due to factors that can be treated as 
purely random. Thus, it should be possible to identify scarring effects by 




                                                      
5 The use of sibling data in the literature on returns to education has been criticised by e.g. 
Griliches (1979) and Bound & Solon (1999) on concern that if indeed siblings are so alike, why 
do they end up with different education? In the current application the corresponding question 
would be “why do they end up in different initial states?” The answer is “due to matching 
frictions”. IFAU – Scarring effects of the first labour market experience  13 
4  Data and descriptive statistics 
The data used in this paper cover four entire cohorts of young individuals 
graduating from vocational and 2-year academic high school programmes 
between 1991 and 1994. The exclusion of 3-year academic programmes is 
motivated by a wish to minimise the impact of direct transitions into further 
education and the assumption that graduates from the 2-year programmes in 
general are aiming at employment (rather than further education) after gradu-
ation. The only other restriction put on the (base) sample is that the graduates 
should be aged 18 or 19 at graduation.  
 
4.1 Data 
The general source of data is the IFAU database that combines data from 
various registers from Statistics Sweden and the National Labour Market 
Board. The original data sources are the high school examination registers 
(UREG) which contain information on grades and courses for all high school 
graduates, a longitudinal income register (LOUISE) that links family members 
to each other and contain information on demographics and socioeconomic 
factors, the employment register (RAMS) containing information on employ-
ment and earnings and an unemployment register (HÄNDEL) which contain 
information on spells of registered unemployment at public employment 
services.  
 
4.1.1  Education and work experience 
The individuals included in this study are all graduates aged 18 or 19 by the 
end of the graduation year from i) vocational 2-year programmes ii) theoretical 
2-year programmes and iii) the vocational 3-year pilot programmes.  
Each student takes a set of courses, some of which are compulsory for all 
students in the programme, and some of which are chosen by the student.
6 Our 
data includes detailed information on course specific grades from which we 
construct three different variables: Overall grade point average (GPA), field 
                                                      
6 The selection of courses taken by each student is a complicated process: Many programmes 
have different specific fields to which the students have to apply in advance, e.g. electricians can 
be either general electricians or specialised on telecommunication. In addition, some courses are 
chosen by the student; typically this choice is between a predetermined set of courses which may 
vary between schools.  IFAU – Scarring effects of the first labour market experience  14
specific grade point average (FGPA) capturing the average grade in courses 
that are directly related to the field of the programme (e.g. “Construction” for 
the Construction workers programme)
7 and a dummy for students that either 
failed or received the grade 1 (out of 5) in any course (Failed). 
By nature, high school graduates have very little labour market experience. 
However, we use information on labour earnings during the final complete 
calendar year in high school and a dummy for whether the student was 
employed in November during the same year. The idea is that these variables 
should capture both unobserved ability (e g in the form of motivation) and 
potential effects of in-school work experience (see e g Häkkinen, 2004). 
 
4.1.2 Demographic  variables 
A key set of background information refers to the parents of the graduates. In 
constructing these data, step-parents and biological parents are treated equally 
since the data are based on household information. These data are used both to 
construct sibling-pairs and in order to generate family characteristics for the 
OLS specification.  
The sibling fixed-effect is of course a key variable. It is identified from the 
identity of the (household) mother. Restricting the analysis to children with 
identical father and mother reduces the sample somewhat primarily through the 
exclusion of graduates from single-mother households but does not affect the 
estimates significantly. 
The observable characterises of the parents used in the OLS specification 
captures:  Immigration status,  Education,  Employment,  Earnings,  Self-
employment, Taxed capital income, Disposable income and Welfare assistance. 
In addition, the regressions without sibling fixed effects also include parish of 
residence dummies in order to further capture the socio-economic background 
of the graduates. A parish is a part of a municipality and the sample includes 
                                                      
7 The FGPA is constructed from the data by looking at the courses most often taken by graduates 
of each programme, excluding general courses such as Swedish and mathematics. The FGPA-
variable is the average grade within the specific courses taken by each student. The ordinary 
GPA is used for the (few) students that did not take any field specific courses and for all students 
from the 3-year vocational programmes in the piloting scheme since their field specific grades 
are missing in the data. In order to assess the robustness of our results we also estimate a model 
including only (18-year old graduates of ) the 2-year vocational programmes.  IFAU – Scarring effects of the first labour market experience  15 
observations from 2048 parishes. All variables are measured during the 
graduates last year in high school.
8  
Individual-level demographic variables capture year of birth, gender and 
country of birth (Swedish, other Nordic county or the rest of the world). The 
only individual-level control variable dated after the graduation year is a 
dummy for military service. The Swedish military is based on conscription, and 
as a result, a large fraction of the males (and very few female volunteers) enter 
the military at some point in time. The decision on if, when and how the 
worker will fulfil his service is usually taken at age 17. The decision can be 
changed (in particular the timing) for different reasons. However, for the 
purpose of this study it is considered to be an exogenous event. Since the 
results for men and women are very similar in our robustness check, this should 
not be a major concern. 
 
4.1.3 Unemployment  and  employment 
One of the two alternative variables used in order to measure initial labour 
market status is a dummy for whether the graduate became unemployed during 
the year following graduation. The unemployment data captures the number of 
days a worker is registered as unemployed at the public employment service,
9 
and a dummy is given the value one if a worker is registered as unemployed for 
at least 50 days between September and May, and zero otherwise.
10 Unemploy-
ment in the subsequent years are measured using corresponding definitions. 
The choice of September to May for the measure of unemployment is based on 
the assumption that registered unemployment experiences during the summer 
months are less informative than the rest of year for young workers. 
Qualitatively, the results are completely robust to changes in the somewhat 
arbitrary cut-off at 50 days in order to be classified as unemployed.  
The alternative explanatory variable is employment after graduation. Em-
ployment is measured using Statistics Sweden’s earnings-based definition 
which codes workers with earnings corresponding to 4 hours of work in 
November as employed. The same definition is also used when employment is 
considered as an outcome variable during the subsequent years.  
                                                      
8 The exception being data on taxed capital income that is taken from the graduation year since 
data for 1990 where unavailable.  
9 We do not include time spent in active labour market programmes. Qualitatively, the results are 
very similar if time spent in labour market programmes is treated as unemployment.  
10 Graduation typically takes place in early June.  IFAU – Scarring effects of the first labour market experience  16
In addition to studying the effects on employment and unemployment, we 
will also study the effects on the natural logarithm of annual labour earnings. In 
the base-line specification observations without earnings are changed to the 
minimum amount in the data (100 SEK ≈ €10) but we also estimate a model 
conditional on being employed in November, which excludes the zero earnings 
cases. Labour earnings are measured by calendar-year so the analysis of the 
effects of initial unemployment on earnings will start two years after 
graduation since the first year overlaps with the initial unemployment period 
(see above). Figure 3 shows the time axis for the analysis. 
 
4.1.4 Aggregate  covariates 
Aggregate unemployment rates are calculated using the unemployment register 
matched with a population-wide register of education. A programme-specific 
unemployment-to-population rate (henceforth referred to as “unemployment 
rate”) is calculated for each combination of programme, municipality and year 
using the 50 days May to September procedure explained above.
11 The 
calculation is based on individuals aged 21 to 35 during the graduation year (i e 
they are 3 to 16 years older than the graduates) in order to get a measure of the 
labour market conditions relevant for relatively young workers. An overall 
municipality unemployment rate is also calculated for each year using the same 
procedure and population but without separating the different programmes. 
Furthermore, all regressions include dummies for graduation year (interacted 
with birth year) in order to remove all aggregate business cycle effects. 
 
                                                      
11 Unique programme unemployment rates can not be calculated for the 3-year vocational 
programmes in the piloting scheme since there are no older graduates. The 2-year programmes 
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Figure 3: The time axis. 
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4.2 Descriptive  statistics 
Table 2 shows data on unemployment and employment during the year 
following graduation. When reading the table it should be noted that the 
different states are not mutually exclusive, i.e. it is possible for the same 
individual to be recorded in more than one of the states.  
 
Table 2: Initial labour market status 
 Unemployed   Graduation 
year  At least 1 day >49 days 
Employed N 
1991 0.47  0.21  0.62  45,348 
1992 0.50  0.29  0.35  46,796 
1993 0.41  0.23  0.26  44,443 
1994 0.35  0.19  0.33  34,659 
All 0.44  0.23  0.39 171,246 
Note: States are not mutually exclusive. “Unemployed” implies registered as openly unemployed 
(thus excluding e.g. participation in labour market programmes) between September of 
graduation year and May of the following year. Employment is for November of graduation year. 
 
The table shows a surprising time-pattern for the unemployment rates that 
are falling between 1991 and 1994. This is quite in contrast to the evolution of 
the macro environment described in Figure 1. One explanation for this 
apparent anomaly is an increase in the fraction pursuing further education. 
During the period there was a gradual increase in the fraction of students 
acquiring one additional year of education directly after graduating from the 2-
year vocational programmes, probably due to a combination of worsening 
labour market conditions and the introduction of 3-year vocational pro-
grammes. In order to assess the importance of further education, the paper will 
use both employment and unemployment as indicators of initial labour market 
performance and use several different sample restrictions when estimating the 
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Figure 3: Unemployment probabilities depending on post-graduation (t = 0) 
unemployment. 
 
Table A1 in  Appendix A shows descriptive statistics for the main time 
invariant covariates used in the analysis. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the 
development over time for unemployment and employment separated by initial 
labour market performance. It is clear that those unemployed after graduation 
are unemployed during the following ten years to a much higher degree. It is 
equally true that those employed after graduation have a higher probability of 
being employed during the 9 years following graduation.  
Figure 5 shows the distribution of the lengths of all unemployment spells 
starting during September through May after graduation (thus the same 
individual may be responsible for several spells). It is evident from the figure 




                                                      
12 It should be noted that unemployment spells may be broken by participation in active labour 
market programmes. However, 90 percent of spells are shorter than 2 years even when all 
reasons for registration at the public employment services (such as e g time in labour market 
programmes and registration for “on-the-job search”) are included. IFAU – Scarring effects of the first labour market experience  20
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5  Sibling fixed effects estimates 
The pattern displayed by the descriptive statistics clearly shows a positive 
correlation between unemployment after graduation and subsequent unemploy-
ment. The purpose of this section is to identify causal effects of unemployment 
subsequent to graduation. The identification strategy uses sibling fixed effects 
to remove all unobserved heterogeneity that is common within a family. The 
identifying assumption required is that all relevant differences between siblings 
are captured by the individual level variables. These variables are Military 
Service  (dummy),  Gender,  Age at graduation (18 or 19, interacted with 
graduation year), Oldest sibling (dummy), Programme, GPA and Field GPA 
interacted with programme, Failed (dummy), in-school employment (dummy) 
and the log of In-school earnings. Note also that included siblings are quite 
similar in age (at most 4 years in between the siblings) as well as educational 
choice and performance (only graduates from vocational or shorter high school 
programs are included). 
Table 3 shows the raw relationship between the unemployment probabilities 
of the youngest and the oldest of each sibling pair. The table shows that 
workers with siblings that were unemployed (employed) at a certain time after 
graduation have 5-10 percentage points higher probability of being unem-
ployed (employed) at the same time after graduation. This suggests that sibling 
fixed effects are good predictors of labour market performance.  
 
Table 3: Labour market performance for sibling-pairs. 
  Young sibling unemployment    Young sibling employment 
Time after 
graduation (t)  
If older sibling 
unemployed 
If older sibling 
not unemployed 
  If older sibling 
employed 
If older sibling 
not employed. 
t = 0  0.30  0.20    0.45  0.38 
t = 1  0.40  0.32    0.57  0.46 
t = 3  0.35  0.26    0.69  0.54 
t = 5  0.21 0.16    0.76 0.66 
Note: The table shows the unemployment (employment) probability of younger siblings 
depending on whether the older sibling was unemployed (employed) at the same time after 
graduation. The “oldest” sibling is randomly chosen if the birth year is the same for both siblings. 
 
It should be noted that the logic behind the identification strategy rests on 
the standard (theoretical) assumption that labour markets are characterised by 
search frictions. Thus, it is likely that even identical  individuals receive IFAU – Scarring effects of the first labour market experience  22
different outcomes for reasons that are entirely random. The question posed in 
this section is whether this randomness has any persistent effects.  
Including sibling fixed-effects implies that all individuals without siblings 
in the base sample are removed. Table A1 in  Appendix  A shows that this 
sample is very similar to the overall sample in most characteristics and 
Section 5 below shows that this reduced sample produces similar results as the 
overall sample when relying on observed characteristics for identification. This 
should ensure that the results we find are not specific to the sibling sample. 
In addition to the individual level variables, the estimated linear probability 
model also includes two measures of the contemporary labour market con-
ditions in the original municipality.
13 The first is average unemployment among 
15 proceeding cohorts of the same high-school programmes for each year and 
municipality. The second measure is municipality-year average defined over 
the same population. Table A2 in Appendix A shows estimates for the control 
variables during some of the outcome years.  
Table 4 shows the estimates of the effects of initial unemployment on future 
labour market performance. Estimates are only calculated for the 7 years (6 
when the outcome is other than unemployment) for which there are 4 full 
cohorts since the number of sibling pairs drops dramatically if only one cohort 
is excluded. The effect of post-graduation unemployment is statistically sig-
nificant for all outcome variables during 5 years after graduation: unemploy-
ment is increased by 3 percentage-points and employment is decreased by 
almost 5 percentage points. Annual earnings are reduced by 17 % after 5 years. 
                                                      
13 The reason for conditioning on the original municipality is to avoid controlling for endogenous 
migration patterns since initial unemployment may affect future mobility.         
 
Table 4: The effects of initial unemployment on labour market performance, sibling fixed effects estimates 
         Year after graduation (t)    
Outcome  t = 1  t = 2  t = 3  t = 4  t = 5  t = 6  t = 7 
0.074** 0.058** 0.037** 0.038** 0.031**  0.014  0.015  Unemployment (1/0)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) 
11.275** 10.331**  4.544**  4.626**  4.299**  2.085  2.139  Days of 
Unemployment  (1.743) (1.829) (1.715) (1.476) (1.374) (1.200) (1.227) 
-0.027* -0.056**  -0.041**  -0.036** -0.047**  -0.004  --  Employment (1/0)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)   
--  -0.320** -0.288** -0.245** -0.175**  -0.089  --  ln(Earnings) 
  (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.058) (0.058)   
Number of cohorts  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
N   17978 17890 17817 17707 17611 17526 17443 
Note: Sample includes all graduates observed with a sibling in the sample. Linear probability estimates of the effect of unemployment subsequent 
to graduation. Regressions include controls for education (Programme, Failed, GPA (by programme), Field GPA (by programme)), Gender, In-
school work (log earnings and working in November), Military service (after graduation and at time t), programme specific municipality 
unemployment at time t, municipality unemployment at time t as well as cohort-birth year interaction dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*Significant at 5 % level. **Significant at 1 % level.  
Table 5: The effects of initial employment on labour market performance, sibling fixed effects estimates 
         Year after graduation (t)    
Outcome  t = 1  t = 2  t = 3  t = 4  t = 5  t = 6  t = 7 
0.249** 0.119** 0.074** 0.034**  0.020  0.039**  -- 
Employment (1/0)  (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)   
1.354** 0.587** 0.289** 0.223**  0.121*  0.185**  -- 
ln(Earnings)  (0.045) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051)   
-0.062**  -0.025*  -0.025* -0.016  -0.006 -0.016* -0.012  Unemployment (1/0)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) 
-5.166**  -2.698 -2.018 -1.551 -1.087  -2.238*  -2.999**  Days of 
Unemployment  (1.486) (1.606) (1.458) (1.292) (1.181) (1.012) (1.038) 
Number of cohorts  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
N   17978 17890 17817 17707 17611 17526 17443 
Note: Sample includes all graduates observed with a sibling in the sample. Linear probability estimates of the effect of unemployment subsequent 
to graduation. Regressions include controls for education (Programme, Failed, GPA (by programme), Field GPA (by programme)), Gender, In-
school work (log earnings and working in November), Military service (after graduation and at time t), programme specific municipality 
unemployment at time t, municipality unemployment at time t as well as cohort-birth year interaction dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*Significant at 5 % level. **Significant at 1 % level. 
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Using employment as the variable measuring initial labour market 
performance gives almost as clear a picture. The results presented in Table 5 
show that initial employment is associated with higher employment and higher 
earnings during the entire follow up period of 6 years. The point-estimates 
when studying the effects of post-graduation employment on future unemploy-
ment show a similar pattern, even though some of the estimates are insig-
nificant. 
The identifying assumption behind the causal interpretation of the estimates 
is that all relevant differences between siblings are captured by the individual 
level covariates. In order to get some indication of the importance of 
heterogeneity within a sibling pair, Figure 7 shows estimates of models with 
and without the individual level covariates and with and without sibling fixed 
effects (using the sibling sample and no family background variables in all 
cases). The results show that the individual level covariates make a large dif-
ference without the fixed effects but only a small difference when the sibling 
fixed effects are included. This is at least an indication that heterogeneity 
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Years after graduation (t)
FE:s & X:s No FE:s, X:s
FE:s, no X:s No FE:s & no X:s
Note: All models include municipality unemployment and year dummies. 
 Family characteristics not included in X. All estimates are significant except 'FE:s & X:s', t>5
Estimated effects of initial unemployment on subsequent unemployment
 
Figure 6: Estimates with and without observed individual characteristics (X) 
and sibling Fixed Effects (FE). 
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One potential alternative to the sibling fixed effects is to use aggregate 
unemployment as an instrument for individual unemployment experiences as 
proposed by Ellwood (1982) and implemented by Gregg (2001). As long as 
aggregate unemployment rates are uncorrelated with unobserved individual 
characteristics, it appears to be a valid instrument. However, experiments with 
this strategy gave two results: First, the standard errors are too large for the 
analysis to be informative. Second, the IV-estimates are much larger than the 
corresponding OLS-estimates. This is in line with the results in Gregg (2001) 
but seems counterintuitive since the point of the instrument is to remove the 
upward bias from unobserved heterogeneity. The reason appear to be that high 
(municipal) unemployment rates not only increases the unemployment pro-
bability of the graduates, but also reduces labour force participation suggesting 
that the negative effect of poor aggregate conditions is larger than estimated by 
a first stage regression. Thus, the direct negative effect of poor labour market 
conditions will be underestimated and the IV estimates of future consequences 
of an unemployment spell will be exaggerated. 
 
5.1  Different forms of duration dependence 
The seminal paper by Heckman & Borjas (1980) defines four different 
categories of true state dependence: “Markovian dependence” (it takes some 
time to leave any state), “duration dependence” (exit rates may be declining 
with time spent in a state), “occurence dependence” (the number of previous 
spells may matter in the future), and “lagged duration dependence” (the lengths 
of previous spells may matter in the future).  
While it is difficult to separate the different forms of duration dependence 
from each other, some tentative conclusions can be drawn. First of all, given 
the short spell lengths displayed in Figure 5 it seems obvious that the long 
lasting effects are driven by effects after the interruption of the initial spell. 
Thus, Markovian or (pure) duration dependence can not be the complete story. 
Furthermore,  Table 6 shows estimates where we separate the effects of 
occurrence and duration of the initial unemployment experience. The results 
suggest that both lagged occurrence and duration are important in the short run, 
however, with a “declining marginal effect” of another day of initial 
unemployment. In the longer run, however, it appears as if the effects of short 
spells disappears, suggesting that lagged duration dependence is driving the 
results in the longer perspective. Some caution is warranted though since the IFAU –  Scarring effects of the first labour market experience  27 
estimates are quite imprecise and few of the differences between estimates are 
significant. 
 
Table 6: Effects of the amounts of initial unemployment.  
 Effect  on  unemployment  at  year  t   Days of initial un-
employment (t = 0)  t = 1  t = 3  t = 5 
Fraction of 
total 
0.050** 0.024  -0.015  1-20 days  (0.018) (0.017) (0.014)  8.7 % 
0.067** 0.026  0.013  21-50 days  (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) 12.1 % 
0.092** 0.051** 0.035**  51-100 days  (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) 13.6 % 
0.102** 0.041*  0.033*  >100 days  (0.020) (0.019) (0.017)  8.3 % 
Note: Sample includes all graduates observed with a sibling in the sample. Linear probability 
estimates of the effects of unemployment subsequent to graduation on the probability of being 
unemployed at least 50 days t years later with separate effects depending on the number of days 
of initial unemployment. Regressions include sibling fixed effects and controls for education 
(Programme, Failed, GPA (by programme), Field GPA (by programme)), Gender, In-school 
work (log earnings and working in November), Military service (after graduation and at time t), 
programme specific municipality unemployment at time t, municipality unemployment at time t 
as well as cohort-birth year interaction dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant 
at 5 % level. **Significant at 1 % level. 
 
 
6  Sub-sample OLS estimates 
Even the most conservative interpretation of the sibling fixed effects estimates 
imply large and significant effects five years after graduation and there are 
some indications of even more long lasting causal effects. The purpose of this 
section is to study the robustness of the results to different sample restrictions 
and to study potential heterogeneity in the scarring effects.  
Using a sibling fixed effects specification comes with a substantial cost in 
degrees of freedom: only 10 percent of the sample is used and the average 
number of individuals per fixed effect is 2.03. Thus, when studying the effects 
in smaller sub-samples we would rapidly encounter problems with too large 
standard errors (as an example, restricting the analysis by gender will reduce 
the sample by three quarters since all mixed sibling pairs would be dropped). 
Instead we use an OLS specification where a rich set of observed IFAU – Scarring effects of the first labour market experience  28
socioeconomic family background variables act as a substitute for the sibling 
fixed effects. 
The estimated equations use all available observable family background 
information (see Section 3.1.2 and Appendix A) instead of the sibling fixed 
effects. The estimated linear probability model thus includes variables captur-
ing ethnicity, education, employment, self-employment, earnings, welfare 
receipts, disposable income and capital income of the parents and geographical 
location dummies at the parish (sub-municipal) level as well as the individual 
background characteristics and the two measures of labour market conditions 












































1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Years after graduation (t)
Sibling FE estimates Upper bound (95 % c i)
OLS estimates (sibling sample) Lower bound (95 % c i)
Note: Confidence intervalls are for the sibling FE estimates. 
 The OLS model includes observable family  characteristics.
Estimated effects of initial unemployment on subsequent unemployment
Figure 7: A comparison between Sibling Fixed Effects (FE) estimates and OLS 
estimates: State dependence in unemployment. 
 
In order to highlight the differences in estimates, Figure 7 and Figure 8 
display how the estimates change when we base the identification on observ-
ables rather than the sibling fixed effects. Note that the OLS estimates in the 
figure are based on the siblings-sample in order to isolate the difference in 
estimates between specifications. The OLS estimates are somewhat larger in 
magnitude than the sibling fixed effects estimates; the differences are in the IFAU –  Scarring effects of the first labour market experience  29 
order of one to two standard errors from the sibling model. The confidence 
intervals of the OLS estimates (not included in the figure) are much smaller 
since removing the fixed-effects in practice increases the degrees of freedom 
by a factor of almost 2.  
The fact that the OLS specifications generate somewhat larger estimates 
than the sibling fixed effects specification probably implies that the OLS 
estimates are upward biased. However, under the implicit assumption that this 
bias is similar in different sub-samples, we find it worthwhile to use the OLS 
specification to gain the precision we need for sub-sample analyses to be 
informative. The idea is that differences between estimates from different sub-














































1 2 3 4 5 6
Years after graduation (t)
Sibling FE estimates Upper bound (95 % c i)
OLS estimates (sibling sample) Lower bound (95 % c i)
Note: Confidence intervalls are for the sibling FE estimates. 
 The OLS model includes observable family  characteristics.
Estimated effects of initial employment on subsequent employment
Figure 8: A comparison between Sibling Fixed Effects (FE) estimates and OLS 
estimates: State dependence in employment. 
 
Table 7 uses the OLS specification to study the effects of teenage unem-
ployment for the two genders separately. The estimates show that the effects 
are very similar for males and females. It should, however, be noted that most 
programmes are dominated by one gender so that it is difficult to rule out that 
possible behavioural differences between males and females are counteracted IFAU – Scarring effects of the first labour market experience  30
by differences between occupations. The table also show separate estimates for 
immigrants and for the 1991-cohort which entered the labour market when 
conditions were relatively good. Again, the patterns are in all cases consistent 
with the overall estimates. Experiments with other interactions (such as grades) 
do not indicate any substantial heterogeneity in the effects either. Thus, the 
overall impression is that the long-run effects of teenage unemployment are 
quite homogeneous. 
Table 7 also shows robustness checks using different sub-samples:
14 It is 
shown that the estimates are insensitive to restrictions on the sample by: i) 
excluding individuals that acquire further education after graduation, ii) only 
including those that entered the labour force directly after graduation, iii) only 
including 18 year-old graduates from 2-year vocational programmes. As 
already noted, the estimated effect is also very similar for the 1991-cohort 
when fewer individuals acquired further education. Since these estimates differ 
very little from the baseline specification, transitions to further education do 
not appear to be a major problem. It is also shown that the estimated marginal 
effects from probits are virtually identical to the estimates from the linear 
probability models.  
Table B1 in Appendix B shows estimates using employment to measure 
initial labour market status corresponding to Table 7 and the results are in all 
cases compatible. Table B2 in the appendix also shows OLS-estimates of the 
effects of initial unemployment on future labour market performance for the 
entire sample (thus including also those without siblings). The estimates are 
calculated for up to 10 years after graduation but it should be noted that the 
number of included cohorts is decreasing for each year after t = 7 (t = 6 when 
employment or earnings is the outcome). With the potential bias discussed 
above in mind, it is worth noticing that the estimates are significantly different 
from zero even ten years after graduation. It is also shown that there is an 
earnings penalty of 6 % 9 years after graduation for those actually receiving 
employment that year. Using employment to measure initial labour market 
performance gives an equally clear picture (see Table B3).  
 
 
                                                      
14 Table A3 in Appendix A shows control variable estimates for some of the outcome years. 
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Table 7: Sub-sample estimates (OLS-specification) – effects of initial 
unemployment on future unemployment. 
   Unemployment at year t     
  t = 1  t =3  t =5   t =7   t =9 N(t=1) 
0.117** 0.056** 0.035** 0.026** 0.019**  Full sample  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
170,811 
0.121** 0.052** 0.035** 0.025** 0.018**  Males  (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 96,710 
0.107** 0.060** 0.034** 0.025** 0.019**  Females
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 74,101 
0.113** 0.055** 0.035** 0.028** 0.021**  Immigrants,  
1
st or 2
nd generation  (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 61,048 
0.140** 0.072** 0.045** 0.023** 0.019**  1991-cohort only  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 45,205 
0.114** 0.056** 0.033** 0.026** 0.019**  No tertiary education  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 133,634 
0.167** 0.087** 0.044** 0.031** 0.020**  In labour force after 
graduation
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 91,408 
0.110** 0.053** 0.033** 0.025** 0.015**  18 y.o. grad:s from 
2-year voc. prog:s  (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 90,518 
0.098** 0.047** 0.048** 0.023**  Sibling sample  (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) 
-- 17,978 
0.124** 0.057** 0.032** 0.023** 0.016**  Probit (full sample)
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
170,811 
Number of cohorts  4 4 4 4 2   
N (full sample)  170,811 169,993 168,888 168,036  90,156   
Note: Linear probability (except for “Probit”) estimates of the effects of unemployment after 
graduation on subsequent unemployment. All regressions include programme dummies, birth-
year dummies interacted with cohort (except “1991-cohort only”) and parish fixed effects (except 
“Probit”) as well as all the controls described in table B1 (GPA and Field-GPA effects are 
interacted with programme dummies). “No tertiary education” sample excludes those who 
achieved any tertiary education by 2000. “In labour force” only includes observations that are 
unemployed or employed at t = 0. “Sibling sample” only includes those with siblings observed in 
the sample. “Probit” reports marginal effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at 5 
% level. **Significant at 1 % level. 
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7 Concluding  remarks 
Young workers that enter unemployment exit much faster than older workers 
which could suggest that youth unemployment is a harmless state requiring 
little attention from policymakers. However, little is known about the long run 
effects of early unemployment experiences. Partly this is because separating 
causal effects of unemployment from unobserved heterogeneity is an intrin-
sically difficult task. 
The results in this paper show that experiences of unemployment subse-
quent to graduation have negative effects on both unemployment and earnings 
at least 5 years after graduation. Furthermore, the effects are far from trivial in 
size: the unemployment probability increases by 3 percentage points and 
annual earnings are reduced by 17 % after 5 years.  
The results give no direct evidence on the nature or causes of the scarring 
effects. A few things can however be noted: First, the effects survive long after 
the completed unemployment spells (since most spells are short). Second, the 
size of the effects decline over time. Third, there is a short-run effect of both 
incidence and duration but the effects of shorter spells appear to decline faster 
over time (see Table 6).  
Since we know little about how human capital behaves during career 
interruptions it is difficult to say whether or not the results could be generated 
by skill-loss. However if skill-loss is the explanation, it has to be the case that 
time compensates for lost skills and, in particular, for the loss during short 
spells. The time pattern of the results fit nicely into a story where employers 
use workers’ unemployment history as a screening device when hiring. It 
seems reasonable that (especially short) spells several years ago either are 
assumed to contain little information or are not detected in the hiring process. 
Seniority rules, on the other hand,  are not likely to be the sole explanation of 
the results since none of the workers included in this study had had any tenure 
to lose before becoming unemployed. However, seniority rules may certainly 
reinforce scarring effects that occurs for other reason  
To conclude, the estimates suggest a long-lasting negative causal effect of 
unemployment at the time of labour market entry implying that policy initia-
tives to combat youth unemployment may well be worthwhile despite the short 
average spell-length among young unemployed. More research is however 
needed in order to define the exact mechanisms behind the results. IFAU –  Scarring effects of the first labour market experience  33 
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Appendix A: Covariates  
Table A1: Descriptive statistics 
  No tertiary 
 
Full sample  Sibling 
sample  Females 
education 
Failed  a  course  0.158 0.152 0.140 0.183 
3.111 3.110 3.206 3.007  GPA (1-5) 
(0.614) (0.607) (0.608) (0.589) 
3.187 3.203 3.253 3.096  Field GPA (1-5)  (0.742) (0.738) (0.691) (0.738) 
2-year theoretical  0.138 0.127 0.196 0.114 
3-year vocational  0.187 0.176 0.166 0.146 
Male 0.566  0.567  --  0.593 
Graduation  age  18.4 18.3 18.4 18.3 
Mean  cohort  1992.4 1992.4 1992.4 1992.4 
Immigrant  0.042 0.050 0.047 0.043 
Nordic  immigrant  0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
In-school work (Nov)  0.194  0.201  0.226  0.190 
103.8 106.9 106.5 100.7  In-school earnings (100 
SEK)  (110.2) (112.1) (107.2) (110.7) 
0.616 0.542 0.602 0.593  Ln(Disposable income) 
(0.385) (0.314) (0.398) (0.381) 
Family on welfare  0.061  0.083  0.063  0.067 
Self-emp.  parent  0.099 0.117 0.089 0.100 
Single  mother  0.176 0.140 0.186 0.182 
Single  father  0.044 -- 0.036  0.046 
Living  alone  0.030 -- 0.043  0.032 
Mother  immigrant  0.169 0.107 0.170 0.177 
Father  immigrant  0.278 0.224 0.298 0.289 
Both  parents  imm.  0.100 0.078 0.109 0.105 
Mother  working  0.907 0.902 0.907 0.900 
Father  working  0.894 0.887 0.894 0.887 
1195 1145 1187 1167  Mother’s earnings 
(100 SEK)  (559) (544) (553) (545) 
1874 1805 1871 1815  Father’s earnings 
(100 SEK)  (921) (885) (917) (867) 
Military service at t = 0  0.024  0.022  0.000  0.025 
Tertiary education in 
2000  0.204 0.191 0.251  -- 
N  171816 17500  74598 134352 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table A2: Control-variable estimates, sibling fixed effects specification.  
   Unemployment     Employment   
  Year after graduation (t)  Year after graduation (t) 
  t = 1  t = 3  t = 5  t = 1  t = 3  t = 5 
-0.008 0.002 0.032*  -0.027  -0.041*  -0.067**  Failed a course 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
-0.051**  -0.051**  -0.038** -0.021 -0.054**  -0.035*  GPA (1-5)
1 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
-0.022 -0.030** -0.006  0.015  0.056** 0.044**  Field GPA (1-5)
1 
(0.012) (0.011)  (0.01)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
-0.052** 0.009  -0.018  -0.019 0.082**  0.078**  Female  (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
-0.004 0.012 -0.006 0.004 0.001 0.007  Oldest sibling  (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
-0.048** -0.014  -0.001 0.039**  0.008  0.007  In-school work (Nov)  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.01)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
-0.004 -0.009**  0  0.012** 0.013**  0.004  Ln (In-school 
earnings)   (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
-0.03 -0.002  -0.003  0.252**  0.054 0.070*  Military service after 
graduation
2  (0.037) (0.033) (0.029) (0.036) (0.034) (0.029) 
0.085** 0.027  -0.031  -0.202**  -0.127**  -0.275**  Military service at t  (0.017) (0.016) (0.064) (0.016) (0.017) (0.077) 
0.057** 0.036*  0.024 -0.090** -0.022  -0.002  ln(Programme/municipal
ity unemployment at t)  (0.02) (0.017)  (0.013)  (0.019) (0.018) (0.015) 
0.084 0.118* -0.023 -0.105 -0.011 0.047  ln(Municipality 
unemployment at t)  (0.056) (0.05) (0.037)  (0.056) (0.052) (0.044) 
Number  of  cohorts  4 4 4 4 4 4 
N  17990 17830 17623 17990 17830 17623 
Note: All regressions include programme dummies, cohort birth-year interaction dummies and 
municipality fixed effects as well as unemployment/employment subsequent to graduation. 
1GPA 
is interacted with programme in all main regressions. 
2Applies to less than 2 % of the sample. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at 5 % level. **Significant at 1 % level. 
 IFAU –  Scarring effects of the first labour market experience  39 
Table A3: Control-variable estimates, OLS-specification (full sample) 
   Unemployment     Employment   
  Year after graduation (t)  Year after graduation (t) 
  t = 1  t = 3  t = 7  t = 1  t = 3  t = 7 
0.003 0.013**  0.024**  -0.049**  -0.074**  -0.051**  Failed a course 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
-0.053** -0.033** -0.008** -0.050** -0.059** -0.039**  GPA (1-5)
1 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
-0.040** -0.047** -0.026** 0.041**  0.061**  0.050**  Field GPA (1-5)
1 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
0.064**  0.013** 0.002 0.028**  -0.052**  -0.065**  Female  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
-0.003 0.025**  0.022**  -0.062**  -0.082**  -0.056**  Immigrant  (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
-0.004 -0.018  -0.030**  0.059**  0.064**  0.042**  Nordic immigrant
2 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 
-0.023** -0.016** -0.006** 0.047**  0.019**  0.002  In-school work (Nov)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
-0.013** -0.012** -0.006** 0.026**  0.022**  0.012**  Ln (In-school 
earnings)   (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
-0.007 -0.021**  -0.008**  0.023** 0.032** 0.017**  Disposable income  (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
0.027** 0.027** 0.019** -0.032**  -0.056**  -0.038**  Family on welfare  (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
-0.585 -1.370  -0.955** -0.300  -0.604  -0.419  Family’s capital 
income   (1.003) (0.732) (0.345) (0.611) (0.940) (0.725) 
-0.031** -0.029** -0.017** 0.028**  0.033**  0.016**  Self-employed parent  (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
-0.002 0.004 -0.009 0.001 0.005 -0.001  Living with single 
mother  (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
-0.023* -0.002  -0.019**  0.033**  0.038** 0.024*  Living with single 
father  (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
-0.059** -0.042** -0.044** 0.062**  0.058**  0.051**  Living alone
2 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
0.027** 0.013* 0.022**  -0.019**  -0.028**  -0.028**  Mother immigrant  (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
0.025** 0.014* 0.015** -0.014*  -0.026**  -0.018**  Father immigrant  (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
-0.003 0.008 0.001 -0.008 -0.013 -0.01  Both parents 
immigrants  (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Note: Table continues on next page (incl. comments). IFAU – Scarring effects of the first labour market experience  40
Table A3 (Continued) 
   Unemployment     Employment   
  t = 1  t = 3  t = 7  t = 1  t = 3  t = 7 
0.011  0.031** 0.022** -0.015 -0.034** -0.000  Mother working 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
0.021 0.035** 0.005  -0.001 -0.016 -0.026*  Father working  (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
-0.004* -0.006**  -0.004** 0.006** 0.009** 0.006**  Ln(Mother’s earnings)   (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
-0.004* -0.005** -0.002*  0.001  0.004*  0.002  Ln(Father’s earnings)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Mother’s education 
(ref. 2-year h.s.)        
0.009**  0.006*  0.002  0.013** 0.009** 0.010**  Compulsory or less 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.009  -0.018**  -0.014**  3-year high school 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
-0.011**  -0.005  0.002  -0.026** -0.040** -0.032** 
Some tertiary 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
-0.016**  -0.009  0.008*  -0.050** -0.069** -0.057** 
3-year tertiary or more  (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Father’s education 
(ref. 2-year h.s.)        
0.001  -0.007*  0.000  0.009** 0.013** 0.008**  Compulsory or less  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
-0.008*  -0.004  0.007** -0.016** -0.019** -0.012**  3-year high school  (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
-0.013**  -0.009  0.004  -0.030** -0.032** -0.023**  Some tertiary  (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
-0.006  -0.006  0.006  -0.050** -0.086** -0.057**  3-year tertiary or more  (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
-0.021** -0.015*  -0.004  0.247** 0.050** 0.024**  Military service after 
graduation
2  (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
0.075**  0.039**  -0.019  -0.176** -0.129** -0.284** 
Military service at t 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.026) (0.004) (0.004) (0.050) 
0.067** 0.051** 0.017** -0.068**  -0.047** -0.008*  ln(Programme/municipality 
unemployment at t)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
0.095** 0.090**  0.004  -0.065**  -0.047**  0.016  ln(Municipality 
unemployment at t)  (0.016) (0.015) (0.007) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) 
Number  of  cohorts  4 4 4 4 4 3 
N  170,811 169,993 168,036 170,811 169,993 133,954 
Note: All regressions include programme dummies, cohort birth-year interaction dummies and 
municipality fixed effects as well as unemployment/employment subsequent to graduation. 
1GPA 
is interacted with programme in all main regressions. 
2Applies to less than 2 % of the sample. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at 5 % level. **Significant at 1 % level. IFAU –  Scarring effects of the first labour market experience  41 
Appendix B: Further OLS-estimates 
 
Table B1: Sub-sample estimates (OLS-specification) – Effects of initial 
employment on future employment. 
   Employment at year t      
  t = 1  t =3  t =5   t =7   t =9 N(t=1) 
0.279** 0.099** 0.046** 0.032** 0.017**  Full sample 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
170,811 
0.265** 0.102** 0.048** 0.035** 0.018**  Males  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)  96,710 
0.289** 0.089** 0.039** 0.029** 0.019**  Females
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)  74,101 
0.296** 0.112** 0.056** 0.043**  0.018*  Immigrants,  
1
st or 2
nd generation  (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008)  61,048 
0.277** 0.099** 0.044** 0.035** 0.024**  No tertiary education  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)  133,634 
0.216** 0.096** 0.036** 0.030** 0.017**  1991-cohort only  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)  45,205 
0.289** 0.093** 0.043** 0.031** 0.016**  18 y.o. grad:s from 2-
year voc. prog:s  (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)  90,518 
0.273** 0.088** 0.030** 0.030**  Sibling sample  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)  -- 17,978 
0.307** 0.110** 0.050** 0.034** 0.017**  Probit (full sample)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
170,811 
Number of cohorts  4 4 4 3 1   
N (full sample)  170,811 169,993 168,888 133,954  44,334   
Note: Linear probability (except for “Probit”) estimates of the effects of employment after 
graduation on subsequent employment. All regressions include programme dummies, birth-year 
dummies interacted with cohort (except “1991-cohort only” and t = 9) and parish fixed effects 
(except “Probit”) as well as all the controls described in table B1 (GPA and Field-GPA effects 
are interacted with programme dummies). “No tertiary education” sample excludes those who 
achieved any tertiary education by 2000. “Sibling sample” only includes those with siblings 
observed in the sample. “Probit” reports marginal effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*Significant at 5 % level. **Significant at 1 % level. 
  
Table B2: OLS-estimates of the effects of initial employment on future labour market outcomes 
         Year after graduation (t)       
Outcome  t = 1  t = 2  t = 3  t = 4  t = 5  t = 6  t = 7  t = 8  t = 9  t = 10 
0.279** 0.167** 0.099** 0.061** 0.046** 0.039** 0.032** 0.022** 0.017**    Employment (1/0) 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)   
1.545** 0.779** 0.495** 0.328** 0.233** 0.194** 0.138** 0.128** 0.104**    Ln(Earnings)  (0.01) (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.023)   
0.851** 0.423** 0.262** 0.152** 0.108** 0.073** 0.054** 0.025**  0.026*    ln(Earnings) if employed  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011)   
-0.062** -0.064** -0.043** -0.025** -0.017** -0.015** -0.012** -0.007** -0.006**  -0.002  Unemployment (1/0)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Number of cohorts  4 4 4 4 4 4  4(3)  3(2)  2(1)  1 
N (full sample)  170,811 170,476 169,993 169,429 168,888 168,425 168,036 133,817  90,156  44,334 
(Earnings & Employed)  170,811 170,476 169,993 169,429 168,888 168,425  133,954 90,226  44,334   
Note: Linear probability estimates of the effects of initial employment. All regressions include controls for education (Programme, Failed, GPA 
(by programme), Field GPA (by programme)), Demographics (Female, Immigrant, Nordic Immigrant), In-school work (log earnings and working 
in November), Military service (after graduation and at time t), Financial background (Family’s (size adj.) disposable income, Welfare, Capital 
gains, Self employed parent), Family composition (Single mother, Single Father, Living alone), Second generation immigrant (Mother, Father or 
both parents immigrants), Parents labour market attachment (Mother working, Father working, Mothers income, Fathers income), Parents 
education (7 categories for each parent), aggregate conditions (Programme and municipality specific and overall municipality) and include birth 
year dummies interacted with cohort (except for estimates with only one cohort) as well as parish fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*Significant at 5 % level. **Significant at 1 % level.  
   
Table B3: OLS-estimates of the effects of initial unemployment on future labour market outcomes 
         Year after graduation (t)       
Outcome  t = 1  t = 2  t = 3  t = 4  t = 5  t = 6  t = 7  t = 8  t = 9  t = 10 
0.117** 0.082** 0.056** 0.043** 0.035** 0.026** 0.026** 0.020** 0.019** 0.009**  Unemployment (1/0) 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
17.280**  12.414**  8.550** 6.239** 4.844** 3.531** 3.766** 3.090** 2.756** 1.398**  Days of Unemployment  (0.395) (0.419) (0.398) (0.352) (0.308) (0.276) (0.279) (0.286) (0.318) (0.482) 
-0.054** -0.060** -0.057** -0.047** -0.045** -0.039** -0.034** -0.027** -0.024**  --  Employment (1/0)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)   
--  -0.387** -0.322** -0.281** -0.259** -0.221** -0.198** -0.143** -0.126**  --  ln(Earnings) 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.027)   
--  -0.167** -0.149** -0.120** -0.114** -0.095** -0.080** -0.082** -0.057**  --  ln(Earnings) if employed 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013)   
Number of cohorts  4 4 4 4 4 4  4(3)  3(2)  2(1)  1 
N  170,811 170,476 169,993 169,429 168,888 168,425 168,036 133,817  90,156  44,334 
(Earnings & Employed)          (133,954) (90,226)  (44,334)   
[Earnings if employed]    [145,931] [149,862] [151,671] [152,337] [153,631] [122,989]  [83,049]  [40,934]   
Note: Linear probability estimates of the effects of initial employment. All regressions include controls for education (Programme, Failed, GPA 
(by programme), Field GPA (by programme)), Demographics (Female, Immigrant, Nordic Immigrant), In-school work (log earnings and working 
in November), Military service (after graduation and at time t), Financial background (Family’s (size adj.) disposable income Welfare, Capital 
gains, Self employed parent), Family composition (Single mother, Single Father, Living alone), Second generation immigrant (Mother, Father or 
both parents immigrants), Parents labour market attachment (Mother working, Father working, Mothers income, Fathers income), Parents 
education (7 categories for each parent), aggregate conditions (Programme and municipality specific and overall municipality) and include birth 
year dummies interacted with cohort (except for estimates with only one cohort) as well as parish fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*Significant at 5 % level. **Significant at 1 % level.    
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